INTRODUCTION
The theory of the natural rate now dominates the economic counsels of the Federal Reserve. Though theoretically contested and empirically unsubstantiated, this theory has provided the necessary pretext for implementing deflationary monetary policy. This paper argues that there is now an emerging second stage agenda that seeks to institutionalize this policy through the creation of an independent central bank. The claim is that this would improve macroeconomic performance by eliminating the putative inflationary bias of democratically controlled central banks. However, independent central banks have a deflationary bias because central bankers tend to be drawn from the ranks of commercial bankers who identify with financial capital, and have a mild preference for deflation. The reality is that central bank independence entrenches the interests of financial capital, and institutionalizes deflation.
Making this argument involves a complicated train of thought that involves showing (i) how new classical theory has been used to justify deflationary policy, (ii) that deflationary policy furthers the economic interests of Wall Street and financial capital, and (iii) that new classical recommendations for the creation of an independent central bank represent a means of institutionalizing deflationary policy bias. Such an analysis reveals that not only is economic policy making a "contested terrain", but so too is economic theory since it serves to "rationalize" the direction of economic policy.
THE ORIGINS OF DEFLATIONARY POLICY BIAS
Evidence regarding the dominance of zero-inflation policy is now abundantly available. For instance, E. Gerald Corrigan, the former president of the influential Federal Reserve Bank of New York, writes in the 1992 Annual report:
"(E)ven today, with the outlook for inflation seeming to be so benign, we must remain vigilant and we must staunchly resist those voices that would suggest that a "little more" inflation may not be all that bad, especially if it brings a lot more growth.... The battle against inflation is never over and the very minute that a society declares victory in that battle is likely to be the very minute that the seeds of the next round of inflation are sown, with all of their painful and inevitable consequences for the future.... (M)onetary policy and the effort to control inflation rightly stand at the center of the trilogy (of central banking activities and responsibilities)."
This dominance of deflationary bias within the counsels of the Federal
Reserve is the result of the theoretical counter-revolution associated with new classical macroeconomics. Whereas, the economics profession used to view inflation as a lubricant that potentially helped the process of labor market and wage adjustment (Tobin, 1972) 1973, 1976, and 1979 . However, rather than supplementing existing inflation theory with a multi-causal theory of inflation, the economics profession adopted a novel mono-causal theory known as the natural rate of unemployment.
The argument behind natural rate theory is that if unemployment falls below the natural rate, inflation will increase and accelerate as long as unemployment remains below the natural rate. 1 Since ever higher and accelerating rates of inflation are unacceptable, the policy message from natural rate theory is clear: the unemployment rate should not be allowed to fall below its natural rate. Consequently, macroeconomic policy is rigidly bound by an inflation constraint.
The intellectual arguments for the natural rate hypothesis have been bolstered by its rhetorical adoption of the "natural" metaphor, which implies that anything other than the natural rate is "unnatural". If the natural rate were identified with rates of 1 or 2% unemployment, adoption of the theory would be of little significance. However, once the natural rate is defined as 6 -7% unemployment, its adoption implies significantly higher unemployment with huge and unnecessary social and economic costs.
Worse than that, by adopting the language of free markets and perfectly competitive equilibrium, natural rate theory subtly entraps policy makers into the belief that the actual rate is the natural rate. Thus, as macroeconomic performance has faltered over the last two decades, this has led to the notion of a rising natural rate. In the face of persistently rising unemployment, policy makers have been enjoined to do nothing, since actual unemployment represents the natural working of the free market, and trying to reduce unemployment would only contribute to higher inflation.
Introduced by Edmund Phelps (1967) and Milton Friedman (1968) Economic Report the official definition of full-employment was revised to 5. 1% (1979, p.72-74) . By 1983, the triumph of natural rate theory was so complete, that the new term "inflation threshold unemployment rate" (1983, p,37) was introduced, and this new inflation threshold unemployment rate was declared to "probably lie(s) between 6 and 7 percent" (1983, p.37).
The shift towards natural rate policy is vividly captured in figure 1 which shows the actual real three month treasury bill interest rate. This is an interest rate over which the Federal Reserve has significant control, and figure 1 shows how it has dramatically increased in the period after 1974. (Mishkin, 1982) . Moreover, this work has been explicitly conducted on the theoretical grounds defined by new classical macroeconomics, and using the empirical methodology developed by new classical macroeconomists.
At the same time there exist well articulated theoretical models explaining why inflation may lessen unemployment (Tobin, 1972 : Palley, 1994a , and the predictions of these models regarding the existence of a trade-off between inflation and unemployment seem to be repeatedly confirmed in well-specified models of wage inflation (Gordon, 1988 : Rissman, 1993 : Palley, 1994b . In all three periods, including the economically turbulent 1970's, the regression line is negatively sloped, and the coefficient on unemployment is statistically significant at the 5% level in the first and last periods.
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The fact that a Phillips relation is detectable in such rudimentary data analysis suggests that the academic and policy-making ascendancy of new classical macroeconomics is unjustified on positivist grounds, and that the real explanation is political and sociological in character.
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFLATIONARY POLICY BIAS
Whereas the theory of the natural rate has provided the "nominal" justification for the implementation of deflationary monetary policy, understanding the "reality" of deflationary policy requires the adoption of a political economy perspective. Traditional neo-Keynesian economics eschewed such an approach to policy questions, and instead adopted the idealized construct of the benevolent policy maker who always acted in the public interest. Thus, in the literature on optimal monetary policy initiated by Poole (1970) , the Federal Reserve's policy objective function is identified with a social welfare function that fully represents a uniquely defined national interest. New classical macroeconomics has attacked this view, and instead represents the Federal Reserve as following its own private interest, which is different from that of the public interest. However, the public interest is still presented as a single unified interest, so that the Federal Reserve is cast as the villain undermining national welfare. In particular, when placed in natural rate representations of the economy, the Federal Reserve has an interest in generating positive inflation surprises that fool workers into supplying more labor than they would in a perfect information environment.
While new classicals have attacked the earlier neo-Keynesian view of a benevolent public policy-maker on the grounds of bureaucratic failure, new structuralist Keynesians (Epstein, 1992) have attacked the concept of a benevolent public policy maker on grounds of political economy. However, rather than seeing an opposition between the preferences of the policy maker and a monolithic public interest, new structuralists see an absence of a unified public interest. Instead, different economic interests compete for control of the policy authority, so that the preferences of the policy maker are constituted by the political environment, and primarily reflect the preferences of the group that currently has political dominance. This approach to macro policy has been labelled the "contested terrain" approach.
An early statement of this point of view was provided by Boddy and Crotty (1975) , and it has been more fully articulated in Bowles and Gintis (1982) .
The traditional construction of this conflict has been in terms of labor and capital, but Epstein (1992) has refined it by distinguishing between labor, industrial capital, and financial capital. This distinction between industrial and financial capital adds a significant dimension that is important for understanding the turn to deflationary policy.
The above description of the economy's competing political interests can be incorporated into a simple macroeconomic model of policy making. The formal equations of the model are presented in the appendix, but the underlying economic interpretation is as follows. The Federal Reserve can be viewed as maximizing a social welfare function that is a weighted combination of labor's, industrial capital's, and financial capital's welfare functions. The Fed's choice variable is the rate of nominal demand growth, and this choice is made subject to the constraint of a long-run Phillips curve that is negatively sloped in inflation -unemployment space.
The theoretical rationale for a long-run Phillips curve is presented in Palley (1994a) . The argument is that in a multi-sector economy, faster nominal demand growth raises inflation but also reduces aggregate unemployment. This is because wages in sectors with unemployment are less than fully adjusted for inflation. Consequently, faster nominal demand growth contributes to an increase in real demand growth in depressed sectors, and this raises employment in such sectors. However, it also generates inflation in sectors with full employment.
The details of the model are illustrated in figure (6). The upper panel shows the long-run Phillips curve, while the lower panel shows the welfare functions for each group. Lower rates of unemployment increase labor's welfare by increasing the availability of jobs, reducing the insecurity of unemployment, and by raising real wages. This latter effect arises because labor is in a position to bargain for more. Industrial capital's welfare is maximized at U I * which corresponds to the rate of unemployment at which industrial profits are maximized. When U > U I * , demand conditions are depressed and profits are reduced: when U < U I * , though demand conditions are robust, so too are labor market conditions and this serves to reduce profits. Lastly, financial capital's welfare is maximized at U F * which is above U I because financial capital strongly dislikes inflation. When U < U F * , this entails higher inflation which erodes the real value of financial liabilities to financial capital's detriment. When U > U F * , demand and employment conditions conditions are depressed, and this gives rise to an increased rate of default, the costs of which outweigh the benefit of lower inflation.
Rather than having its own separate set of preferences, the Federal 
CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DEFLATIONARY POLICY BIAS
Viewed from the above new structuralist perspective, natural rate theory with its accompanying notion of a binding inflation constraint, has served as a Trojan horse in the capture of the counsels of economic policy.
The reality behind this shift in policy is that it has served to advance the interests of financial and industrial capital at the expense of labor.
The adoption of natural rate policies may be viewed as the initial triumph of conservative political economy. At this stage there is now an emerging new agenda that seeks to permanently institutionalize this development. The key proposal in this new agenda is that the Federal Reserve be transformed into an independent central bank that is free from accountability to and control by elected politicians.
From a new structuralist perspective central bank independence is easily understood in black and white terms of who will control the bank, and who will determine its policy stance. Independence of the central bank is therefore an explicitly political question. If the bank is controlled by labor, its preferences will be tilted toward lower unemployment and higher inflation; if it is controlled by financial capital the reverse holds.
Whereas a new structuralist perspective sees the issue of central bank independence as political, new classical theory has sought to present it as an institutional innovation that would improve macroeconomic performance.
Questions of political economy related to the capture of monetary policy by particular economic interests are effectively denied. The new classical argument against democratically controlled central banks is that they are subject to a temptation to engage in strategic monetary policy, and to use monetary surprises as a means of raising output (Barro and Gordon, 1983) .
Consequently, the public comes to anticipate the central bank's inflationary tendencies, which results in a sub-optimal outcome with higher inflation than first-best policy would choose. The core assumption behind this description is that the central bank has its own private interests which are different from those of the public, and this leads it to prefer a higher rate of inflation than that desired by the public. Thus, the public is presented as having a unified set of preferences so that there is no political conflict, and it is the rogue central bank that fails to pursue the public interest.
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This characterization of the inflation problem can be traced back to the theory of bureaucratic and governmental failure developed by such economists Niskanen (1971) and Tullock (1965) . This theory was initially used as an argument against government interventions to remedy microeconomic market failures related to externalities and public goods: now, it is being invoked to argue against macroeconomic policy interventions to manage the macroeconomy.
Those favoring an independent central bank argue that independence would solve this bureaucratic incentive problem. However, as is formally shown below, this claim is false since an independent central bank would still have discretionary power over monetary policy, and would continue to be guided by the preferences of its senior officers. To the extent that these officers have their own special interests, they will be guided by them. Thus, Equation (3a) is the Lucas supply function, while (3b) determines the rate of inflation given the monetary authority's rule. Solving (3a) and (3b) yields expected inflation of
The determination of general equilibrium involves the joint solution of equations (2) and (4), where these equations represent the reaction functions of the monetary authority and public respectively. This equilibrium is given
Its determination is illustrated in figure (7) , which shows the intersection of the two reaction functions.
The actual equilibrium rate of inflation is therefore influenced by the parameter "e", and this parameter bears a political interpretation in terms of who controls the central bank. If e > 0, this implies finance controls the Fed so that inflation is a "bad" while deflation is be a "good": if e < 0, then labor controls the Fed, and inflation is a good while deflation is a bad. Lastly, though deflation is a good to financial capital, the pursuit of deflation is limited by the term bp 2 /2 which reduces well-being. The logic here is that increased deflation causes bankruptcies and defaults which reduce the well-being of financial interests.
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In the event that an independent central bank is controlled by financial interests this shifts the monetary authority's reaction function A recent paper by Walsh (1995) argues for the use of optimal contracts to govern central bank behavior. Once again it is assumed that there is a unified public interest which is confronted by a rogue central bank. This situation corresponds to a principal-agent problem, and can therefore be remedied by design of an optimal contract embodying appropriate incentives.
This solution could be implemented either by writing performance contracts for the directors of the central bank, or by abolishing the central bank and contracting out its functions to a private banking firm that is paid on a performance basis. "Contracting" rather than "independence" therefore becomes the putative solution to the rogue central bank problem.
However, recognizing the fractured nature of the public's interest means that the terms of the contracting arrangement have to be varied with every shift of political power, or else one set of preferences becomes institutionalized through the contract. In this case, the system would correspond to "discretionary contracted central banking", an arrangement that is almost akin to the current system of "discretionary democratically in different inflation outcomes but has no effect on the equilibrium real output. In a new structuralist model, allocation of control affects both the 18 equilibrium rate of inflation and the level of output. With regard to particulars, the paper suggests that creation of an independent central bank will likely generate a deflationary bias in policy because central bankers tend to be drawn from the ranks of commercial bankers, and these agents represent the interests of financial capital which may have a mild preference for deflation. This theoretical claim appears to be supported by empirical research (Summers and Alessina, 1993) .
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Appendix I
The regression equations associated with figures 3, 4, and 5 are: Each group's well-being is affected by the rate of nominal demand growth which uniquely determines the point of equilibrium on the Phillips curve given by (A.2). Workers are assumed to have diminishing marginal utility, and derive increased benefit from lower unemployment so that V W / g D > 0. When unemployment is high, industrial capital benefits from lower unemployment because this increases the robustness of goods market conditions and raises profitability. However, once unemployment falls below a critical level given by U I * , profitability begins to fall since workers are able to force up real wages. This implies the V I / g D > < 0 if U > < U I * . Lastly, financial capital also initially benefits from higher unemployment
